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More Instruments and Broader Goals:
Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Today I would I like to discuss improvements in our understanding of economic
development.In particular,Iwould like to use this opportunity to discuss the emer-
gence of what is sometimes called the “Post-Washington Consensus.”
My remarks elaborate on two themes.The first is that we have come to a better
understanding ofwhatmakesmarketsworkwell.TheWashingtonConsensus held
that good economic performance required liberalized trade, macroeconomic
stability, and getting prices right. Once the government handled these issues –
essentially, once the government “got out of the way” – private markets would
produce efficient allocations and growth. To be sure, all of these are important if
markets are to work. It is very difficult for investors to make good decisions when
inflation is running at 00 percent. But the policies advanced by the Washington
Consensus are hardly complete – and they are sometimes misguided. Making
markets work requires more than just low inflation. It requires sound financial
regulation, competition police and policies to facilitate the transfer of tech-
nology, and transparency, to name some fundamental issues that the consensus
neglects.
At the same time that we have improved our understanding of the instruments
to promote well-functioning markets,we have broadened the objectives of devel-
opment to include other goals like sustainable development, egalitarian develop-
ment, and democratic development. An important part of development today is
seeking complementary strategies that advance these goals simultaneously. In our
search for these policies, however, we should not ignore the inevitable tradeoffs.
This is the second theme of my remarks.
Some Lessons of the East Asian Financial Crisis
Before discussing my two themes, I would like to address at the outset one issue
that is on many people’s minds: the implications of the East Asian crisis for our
thinking about development. The observation of the successful, some even say
miraculous, East Asian development was one of the motivations for moving
 For the initial exposition of the Washington Consensus see Williamson (990).
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beyond the Washington Consensus. After all, here was a regional cluster of coun-
tries that had not closely followed the Washington Consensus prescriptions but
that had somehow managed the most successful development in history.
To be sure, many of their policies – like low inflation and fiscal prudence –
were perfectly in line with the Washington Consensus. But many, especially
in the financial sector, were not. This observation was the basis for
the World Bank’s study, The East Asian Miracle (World Bank 993) as well
as a stimulus for the recent rethinking of the role of the state in economic develop-
ment.
With the emergence of the financial crisis, the East Asian economies have been
transformed in the minds of many observers from development success story to
misguided followers of flawed economic policies that have led them to themess in
which they find themselves today. Some ideologues have taken advantage of the
current problems besettingEastAsia to suggest that the systemof active state inter-
vention is the root of the problem.They refer to the government-directed loans and
the cozy relations with the large chaebol in the Republic of Korea. They conven-
iently forget the not inconsiderable successes of the past three decades –successes
to which government, despite its occasional mistakes, has certainly contributed.
These achievements are real.They are not a house of cards.No temporary financial
turmoil can detract from these achievements, which include not only large
increases in per capita GDP, but also extended life spans, widespread education,
and dramatically reduced poverty.
Even when the governments directly undertook actions, they had notable
achievements. They created the most efficient steel plants, contrary to the claims
of privatization ideologues who suggested that such successes are at best a fluke,
and atworst impossible.I agree that government should focus onwhat it alone can
do, and it should leave the production of commodities like steel to the private
sector. But the heart of the current problem in most cases is not that government
has done too much, but that it has done too little. In Thailand it was not that
government directed the investments into real estate; it was that government regu-
lators failed to halt it.
Similarly, in Korea there was a big problem of lending to companies with exces-
sively high leverage, and corporate governance issues that include widespread
cross-subsidization. The fault is not that the government misdirected credit (and,
indeed, the problems faced by many U.S. and European banks suggest that they
also may have seriously misdirected credit). Rather, the problem was the govern-
ment’s lack of action – the fact that the government underestimated the impor-
tance of financial regulation and corporate governance.
The East Asian crisis is not a refutation of the East Asian miracle. The more
dogmatic versions of the Washington Consensus do not provide the right frame-
work forunderstanding both the success and the current troubles of theEastAsian
economies. Responses to the East Asian crisis grounded in this view of the world
are likely to be badly flawed and even counterproductive.
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Making Markets Work Better
The Washington Consensus was catalyzed by the experience of Latin American
countries in the 980s. At the time the economies in the region were clearly not
functioning at all. GNP contracted for three straight years in the early 980s. The
inability of markets to function was clearly related to dysfunctional public poli-
cies.Budget deficits were very high –manywere as high as 5 to 0 percent ofGDP–
and the spending underlying themwas not being used for productive purposes but
was being diverted to subsidize the huge and inefficient state sector.With strong
curbs on imports and relatively little emphasis on exports, firms had insufficient
incentives to increase efficiency or to reach and maintain international quality
standards. At first deficits were financed by borrowing – including very heavy
borrowing from abroad. Rising real interest rates in the United States brought an
end to continued borrowing and increased the burden of interest payments,
forcing many countries to resort to seigniorage to finance the gap between high
levels of public spending and the shrinking tax base. The result was very high and
extremely variable inflation. In this environment money became a much costlier
means of exchange, economic behavior was diverted to protecting value rather
than making productive investments, and the relative price variability induced by
the high inflation undermined one of the primary functions of the price system,
conveying information.
It was in the midst of these serious problems that the so-called Washington
Consensus emerged among U.S. economic officials, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and theWorld Bank.I think that now is a good time to reexamine this
consensus. Many countries, like Argentina and Brazil, have pursued successful
stabilizations, and the challenges they face are in designing the next generation
of reforms. Still other countries have always had relatively good policies or face
problems quite different from those of Latin America. In East Asia, for instance,
many governments have been running government surpluses and prior to
the devaluations, inflation was low and falling (figures  and 2).The origins of the
current financial crises are elsewhere, and the solutions will not be found in
the Washington Consensus either.
I will argue that the focus on inflation – the central macroeconomic malady of
the Latin American countries and the backdrop for the Washington Consensus –
has led to macroeconomic policies that may not be the most conducive for long-
term economic growth and has pulled attention away from othermajor sources of
macroeconomic instability, namely weak financial sectors. The focus on freeing
upmarkets as it applied to financial market liberalizationmay actually have had a
perverse effect, contributing to macroeconomic instability through a weakening
of the financial sector. More broadly, the focus on trade liberalization, deregula-
tion, and privatization ignored other important ingredients required to make an
effective market economy,most notably competition; in the end competitionmay
be at least as important as these other ingredients in determining long-term
economic success.
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I will also argue that there are other ingredients essential to economic growth
that were left out or underemphasized by the Washington Consensus. One of
these, education,has beenwidely recognizedwithin the development community,
but the others, such as improvement of technology, may not have received the
attention they deserve.
The success of theWashingtonConsensus as an intellectual doctrine rests on its
simplicity. Although many of its proponents are very sophisticated and subtle in
their thinking, its policy recommendations could be administered by economists
using little more than simple accounting frameworks. They could look at a few
economic indicators–at inflation,money supply growth, interest rates,budget and
trade deficits –and formapicture of the economyand then craft a set of recommen-
dations. Indeed, there have been cases in which economists would fly into a
country, look at and attempt to verify these data, and make macroeconomic
recommendations for policy reforms all in the space of a couple of weeks.2
There are important advantages to the Washington Consensus approach to
policy advice. It focuses on issues of first-order importance, it sets up an easily
reproducible framework, and it is frank in its limitation to establishing the
prerequisites for development. But for these reasons the Washington Consensus
does not offer the most important answers for every question in development.
Deluding ourselves into thinking that it does can lead to misguided policies.
In contrast, the ideas that I discuss here are not so simple; there are no
easy to read thermometers of the economy’s health.And worse still, there may be
tradeoffs in which the economist’s task is to describe alternative consequences of
different policies, but in which the political process may actually have an impor-
tant say in the choice of economic direction. Economic policy may not be just a
matter for technical experts! These conflicts become all the more important when
it comes to the broader development objectives, as I discuss later in this paper.
Macroeconomic Stability
Controlling Inflation. Probably the most important element of the stabiliza-
tion packages promoted by the IMFand others has been controlling inflation.The
argument for aggressive, preemptive strikes against inflation is based on three
premises. The most fundamental premise is that inflation is costly. This provides
the motivation for trying to avert or lower inflation. The second premise is that
once inflation starts to rise it has a tendency to accelerate out of control.This belief
provides a strong motivation for erring on the side of caution in fighting inflation.
2 These issues came up in the management of the U.S. economy.While much research showed that the
United States was able to operate at lower levels of unemployment without an acceleration of infla-
tion, the bright line approach recommended tightening of monetary policy. Had this advice been
followed, the remarkable expansion of theU.S.economy, its lowunemployment rate –which brought
marginalized groups into the labor market, reduced poverty, and contributed substantially to the
reduction of welfare rolls – would all have been thwarted (see chapter 2 of the Economic Report of
the President 997 for some of this analysis).
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Finally, the third premise is that increases in inflation are costly to reverse. The
implication of this premise is that even if you care much more about unemploy-
ment than inflation, you would still keep inflation from increasing today in order
to avoid having to induce large recessions to bring inflation down later on. All
three of these premises are hypotheses that can be tested empirically.
I have discussed this evidence in more detail elsewhere (Stiglitz 997). Here I
would like to summarize it briefly.The evidence has shownonly that high inflation
is costly.Bruno andEasterly (996) found thatwhen countries cross the threshold
of 40 percent annual inflation they fall into a high inflationary growth trap. But
below that level there is no evidence that inflation is costly.3 Barro (997) and
Fischer (993) also confirm that high inflation is, on average, deleterious for
growth,but again they failed to find anyevidence for costs of low levels of inflation.
Fischer also found the same results for the variability of inflation.4 Recent research
by Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (996) suggests that low levels of inflation may
even improve economic performance.
The evidence on the accelerationist hypothesis (also known as letting the genie
out of the bottle or the slippery slope) is unambiguous: there is no evidence that an
increase in the inflation rate is related to past increases in inflation. Finally, in
reference to the third proposition, some recent work has suggested that the
Phillips curve may be concave and thus that the costs of reducing inflationmay be
smaller than the benefits reaped when inflation was rising.
In my view, the conclusion of this research into the consequences of inflation is
that controlling high and medium rates of inflation should be a fundamental
policy priority but that pushing low inflation even lower is not likely to signifi-
cantly improve the functioning of markets.
In 995 more than half of the countries in the developing world had inflation
rates below 5 percent (figure 3). For these 7 countries controlling inflation
should not be a major priority. Controlling inflation is probably an important
component of stabilization and reform in the 22 countries with inflation rates
above 40 percent, almost all of them in Africa, Eastern Europe, and the former
SovietUnion.Interestingly, theWashingtonConsensus emphasis on inflationwas,
if anything, less relevant in the 980s, when even fewer countries had very high
inflation rates.
3 The null hypothesis in this, as inmost other studies of inflation, is that inflation is costless.The failure
to reject this null at low levels of inflation does not prove that inflation is costless, only that we have
no evidence that it is costly.
4 Because the level and variability of inflation are so correlated, Fischer reported great difficulty in
disentangling their separate effects at any level or vance of inflation. This point holds true more
generally: any study of the consequences of inflation probably also picks up costs associatedwith the
variability of inflation.
The strength of the nonlinearity in the relationship between inflation and social welfare is clear from
the outcome of research conducted by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank. Despite the efforts of their
minions of first-rate economists – some of them working full time on the costs of inflation – the Fed
has still failed to find definitive evidence of costs of inflation in the United States. Should they even-
tually succeed in finding such results, theywill only have proven that datamining doeswork,not that
inflation does not.
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Reducing the budget deficit and current account deficit. A second
component of macroeconomic stability has been reducing the size of government,
the budget deficit, and the current account deficit. I return to the issue of the
optimal size of government later; here I focus on the twin deficits. Like inflation,
much evidence shows that large budget deficits are deleterious to economic
performance (Fischer 993; Easterly,Rodriguez, and Schmidt-Hebbel 994).5 The
three methods of financing deficits all have drawbacks: internal finance raises
domestic interest rates, external finance can be unsustainable, and money crea-
tion causes inflation.
But there is no simple optimum level of the budget deficit.The optimumdeficit –
or the range of sustainable deficits – depends on circumstances, including the
cyclical state of the economy, prospects for future growth, the uses of government
spending, the depth of financial markets, and the levels of national savings and
national investment.TheUnited States, for example, is trying to balance its budget.
I think that the United States should probably aim for budget surpluses, consid-
ering its low private savings rate and the aging of the baby boom generation. In
contrast, the case for maintaining budget surpluses in the East Asian countries,
with their high private savings and transitory growth slowdown, is less compelling.
Ethiopia’s experience emphasizes another determinant of optimal deficits, the
source of financing. For the last several years Ethiopia has run a deficit of about
8 percent of GDP. Some policy advisers would like Ethiopia to lower its deficit.
Others have argued that the deficit is financed by a steady and predictable inflow
of highly concessional foreign assistance,aid driven not by the necessity of filling a
budget gap but by the availability of high returns to investment. In these circum-
stances – and given the high returns to government investment in such crucial
areas as primary education and physical infrastructure (especially roads and
energy) – it maymake sense for the government to treat foreign aid as a legitimate
source of revenue, just like taxes,and to balance the budget inclusive of foreign aid.
The optimal level of the current account deficit is also indeterminate in general.
Current account deficits,aswe all know,occurwhen a country investsmore than it
saves. They are neither inherently good nor inherently bad, but depend on the
circumstances, especially on the use of the investment. In many countries the rate
of return on investment far exceeds the cost of international capital. In these
circumstances current account deficits are sustainable.6
The form of the financing also matters. The advantage of foreign direct invest-
ment is not just the capital and knowledge that it supplies, but also the fact that it
tends to be very stable. In contrast, Thailand’s 8 percent current account deficit
last year was not only large but came in the form of short-term, dollar-denomi-
5 The theoretical literature on Ricardian equivalence (Barro 974) criticizes the view that the deficit
by itself has significant economic effects. Although this literature has been criticized on both theo-
retical and empirical grounds, the Washington Consensus was not based on models that explicitly
addressed the issue of Ricardian equivalence.
6 The current account deficit is an endogenous variable.Assessin whether it is too “high”depends on
the explanation for its size, for example, misguided foreign exchange policies.
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nated debt thatwas used to finance local currency-denominated investment,often
in excessive and unproductive uses like real estate. More generally, short-term
debt and portfolio flows can bring the costs of high volatility without the benefits
of knowledge spillovers.7
Stabilizing output and promoting long-run growth. Ironically, macro-
economic stability – as seen by the Washington Consensus – typically downplays
the most fundamental element of stability: stabilizing output or unemployment.
Minimizing or avoiding major economic contractions should be one of the most
important goals of policy. In the short run, large-scale involuntary unemployment
is clearly inefficient. In purely economic terms it represents idle resources that
could be used more productively.Also some research to which I have contributed
has emphasized that business cycles themselves can have important conse-
quences for long-run growth.8 The research found that the difficulty of borrowing
to finance research and development means that firms will need to drastically
reduce their expenditures on research and development when their cash
flow slows in a downturn. The result is slower total factor productivity growth
in the future. The research also found evidence that this effect is important in
the United States: whether it matters in countries in which research and develop-
ment plays less of a role requires further study. But more generally, variability of
output almost certainly contributes to uncertainty, and thus discourages invest-
ment.
Variability of output is especially pronounced in developing countries.9 The
median high-income country has a standard deviation of annual growth rates of
2.8,while the median developing country has a standard deviation of 5 percent or
higher – implying huge deviations in the growth rate (figure 4). As one would
expect, growth is especially volatile in Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East
and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Howcanwepromotemacroeconomic stability in the sense of stabilizing output
or employment? The traditional answer is good macroeconomic policy, including
countercyclical monetary policy and a fiscal policy that allows automatic stabi-
lizers to operate. These policies are certainly necessary, but a growing literature,
both theoretical and empirical, emphasizes the important microeconomic under-
pinnings of macroeconomic stability, such as financial markets, and explains
economic downturns through such mechanisms as credit rationing and banking
and firm failures.0
7 Traditional government macroeconomic policies do not deal directly with these issues. If the
maturity structure of foreign borrowing leads to significant risks, other capital restraints may be
necessary.
8 See Stiglitz (994) for a broad overview of my research with Bruce Greenwald and AndrewWeiss on
this issue.
9 A very creative exploration of this idea is contained in Pritchett (997).
0 This sometimes is described as debt deflation because fixed interest payments reduce firms cash
flows in economic downturns, decreasing their investment and further weakening the economy; see
Greenwald and Stiglitz (988, 993a,b).
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In the 9th century most of the major economic downturns in industrial coun-
tries resulted from financial panics that were sometimes preceded by but invari-
ably led to precipitous declines in asset prices and to widespread banking failures.
In some countries improvements in regulations and supervision, the introduction
of deposit insurance, and the shaping of incentives for financial institutions have
all reduced the incidence and severity of financial panics.Even so, financial crises
continue, and there is some evidence that they have gotten more frequent and
more severe in recent years (Caprio andKlingebiel 997).The losses from the noto-
rious savings and loan debacle in the United States were, even after adjusting for
inflation, several times larger than the losses experienced in theGreatDepression.
Yet this debacle, when measured relative to GDP, would not make the top 25
banking crises since the early 980s.Table  shows the fiscal cost of banking crises
relative to GDP in selected countries.
Banking crises have severe macroeconomic consequences. During 975-94
growth edged up slightly in countries that did not experience banking crises
(figure 5).Countries with banking crises saw growth slowby .3 percentage points
in the five years following a crisis. Clearly, building robust financial systems is a
crucial part of promoting macroeconomic stability.
Financial Reform
The importance of building robust financial systems goes beyond simply averting
economic crisis. I have sometimes likened the financial system to the brain of
the economy. It plays an important role in collecting and aggregating savings
from agents who have excess resources today. These resources are allocated to
others – like entrepreneurs and home builders – who can use them productively.
Well-functioning financial systems do a very good job of selecting the most
productive recipients for these resources. In contrast,poorly functioning financial
systems will often allocate capital to low-productivity investments. Selecting
projects is only the first stage. The financial system needs to continue to monitor
the use of funds, ensuring that they continue to be used productively. In the
process financial systems serve a number of other functions, including reducing
risk, increasing liquidity, and conveying information. All of these functions are
essential to both the growth of capital and the increase in total factor productivity.
Left to themselves, financial systems will not do a very good job of fulfilling
these functions.The most important lesson of the theory and observation of finan-
cial markets is the pervasiveness of market failure. Incomplete information,
incomplete markets, and incomplete contracts are all particularly severe in the
financial sector, resulting in an equilibrium that is not even constrained-Pareto
efficient (Greenwald and Stiglitz 986).A sound legal framework combined with
regulation and oversight is necessary to mitigate these information problems and
foster the conditions for efficient financial markets.
In successful financial markets regulations serve four purposes: maintaining
safety and soundness (prudential regulation), promoting competition, protecting
19Joseph E. Stiglitz
consumers, and ensuring that underserved groups have some access to capital. In
many cases, the pursuit of social objectives – such as ensuring a supply of funds to
minorities and poor communities (as under the U. S. Community Reinvestment
Act), ensuring a supply of funds for mortgages (the essential mission of the U.S.
government-created Federal National Mortgage Association), or ensuring a
supply of funds for small businesses (the central objective of the U.S. Small Busi-
ness Administration – can, if done well, reinforce economic objectives. Similarly,
protecting consumers is not only good social policy, but is also essential for main-
taining confidence in a level playing field in economic markets, without which
those markets will remain thin and ineffective.
There are times, however, when policymakers might face tradeoffs among
conflicting objectives. For instance, the East Asian countries adopted financial
restraints. These restraints increased the franchise values of banks, discouraging
them from taking unwarranted risks that otherwise might have destabilized the
banking sector. Although there were undoubtedly some economic costs associ-
ated with these restraints, the gains from greater stability almost surely
outweighed these losses.
Previous efforts by theWorldBank and others have tried to build better banking
systems. In practice, however, the changes, including institutional development,
changes in credit culture, and moral hazard, have all proved harder to make
progress on than such short-term solutions as recapitalizing the banking system.
In the worst cases, however, these temporary fixes may have undermined pres-
sures for further reform.And since the fundamental problemswere not addressed,
we would sometimes find ourselves returning to the same countries over and over
again.
TheWashingtonConsensus developed in a context of highly regulated financial
systems,with regulations designedmore to limit competition than to promote any
of the four legitimate objectives of regulation.But all too often the dogma of liber-
alization became an end in itself, not a means to a better financial system. I do not
have time to delve into all of the many facets of liberalization, which include
freeing up deposit and lending rates, opening up to foreign banks, removing
restrictions from capital account transactions, and removing restrictions on bank
lending. But I do want to make a few general points.
First, the key issue should not be liberalization or deregulation, but the
construction of a regulatory framework that ensures an effective financial system.
This will require, in many countries, changing the regulatory framework and elimi-
nating regulations that serve only to restrict competition.But the changes need to
be accompanied by increased regulations to ensure competition and prudential
behavior (and to ensure that banks have appropriate incentives).
Second,even once the design of the desired financial system is in place,due care
will have to be exercised in the transition. The attempt to deregulate almost over-
night, sometimes known as the “big bang,” ignores the very sensitive issues of
sequencing. Thailand, for instance, used to have restrictions on bank lending to
real estate. In the process of liberalization it got rid of these restrictions without
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establishing a more sophisticated risk-based regulatory regime. Combined with
several other factors, the result was the large-scale misallocation of capital to fuel
a real estate bubble, an important factor in the financial crisis.
It is important to recognize how difficult it is to establish a vibrant financial
sector.Even economies with sophisticated institutions, like the United States and
Sweden, have faced serious problems with their financial sectors. The challenges
developing countries face are all the greater, and yet the institutional base from
which they start is all the weaker.
Third, in all countries a primary objective of regulation should be to ensure that
participants have the right incentives: government cannot and should not be
involved in monitoring every transaction.
In the banking system, liberalization will not work unless regulations create
incentives for bank owners,markets, and supervisors to use their information effi-
ciently and act prudentially. It is equally important to address incentive issues in
securities markets. It must be more profitable for managers to create economic
value than to deprive minority shareholders of their assets: rent seeking can be
every bit as much a problem in the private as in the public sector. The Czech
Republic has shown that without the appropriate legal framework, securities
markets can fail to perform their vital functions – much to the detriment to the
country’s long-term economic growth. Laws are required to protect the interests
of shareholders, especially minority shareholders.
The focus on the microeconomic, particularly financial, underpinnings of the
macroeconomy also has implications for responses to currency turmoil. In
particular, when currency turmoil is the consequence of a failing financial sector,
the conventional policy response of increasing interest rates may be counterpro-
ductive. Thematurity and interest rate composition of bank and corporate assets
and liabilities are frequently very different, in part because of the strong incentives
for banks to use short-term debt to monitor and influence borrower firms and for
depositors to use short-term deposits to monitor and influence banks (Rey and
Stiglitz 993).As a result, interest rate increases can lead to substantial reductions
in bank net worth-further exacerbating the banking crisis.Empirical studies have
confirmed that interest rate rises tend to increase the probability of banking crises
and that currency devaluations have no significant effect (Demirgüc¸-Kunt and
Detragiache 997).2
11 Supporters of these policies, while recognizing the problems, argue that a temporary increase in
interest rates is required to restore confidence and that so long as the interest rare measures are very
short term, little damage will be done. Whether increases in interest rates will, or should, restore
confidence has been much debated.The evidence in recent experience is not fully supportive. In any
case, Thailand and Indonesia have been pursuing high-interest rate policies for months.
2 Most analyses of the U.S. saving and loan crisis place the ultimate blame on the unexpectedly large
increases in interest rates in the early 980s under then-Fed Chairman Paul Volcker. The value of
assets plunged, leaving many with a low or negative net worth. Attempts to patch up the problem
(part of regulatory forbearance) failed, exacerbating the magnitude of the problem, until by the late
980s, the problem could no longer be ignored.
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There is another reason that government should perhaps be more sensitive to
interest rate changes than to exchange rate changes: while there is an economic
logic between maturity mismatches, there is no corresponding justification for
exchange rate mismatches. There is a real cost associated with forcing firms to
reducematuritymismatches.Exchange ratemismatches,by contrast, simply repre-
sent speculative behavior. In practice, policy cannot rely on these general
nostrums,but needs to look carefully at the situationwithin the country in crisis. It
is possible that currencymismatches are far larger thanmaturitymismatches, and
while future actions might be directed at correcting such speculation with its
systemic effects, current policy must deal with the realities of today.
Competition
I want to return to our broader theme: making markets work better. So far I have
argued that macroeconomic policy needs to encompass more than a single-
minded focus on inflation and budget deficits. The set of policies underlying the
Washington Consensus is neither necessary nor sufficient for macroeconomic
stability or long-term development. Achieving these goals requires sound finan-
cial markets, but the agenda for creating sound financial markets should not
confusemeanswith ends.Financial liberalization is not the issue.Redesigning the
regulatory system is – or should be.
Central to the success of a market economy is competition. Here, too, there
has been some confusion between means and ends. Policies that should have
been viewed as means to achieve a more competitive marketplace were instead
seen as ends in themselves and as a result, they sometimes failed to attain their
objectives.
The fundamental theorems of welfare economics, the results that establish the
efficiency of amarket economy,have two basic assumptions: private property and
competitivemarkets.Many countries, especially developing and transition econo-
mies, are lacking in both. Until recently, however, emphasis has been placed
almost exclusively on creating private property and liberalizing trade –with liber-
alizing trade being confused with establishing competitive markets. These are
important objectives, but we are unlikely to realize their full benefits without
creating a competitive economy.
FreeTrade.Trade liberalization, leading eventually to free trade,was a key part
of the Washington Consensus. The emphasis on trade liberalization was natural.
Latin American economies had stagnated behind protectionist barriers.3 Import
substitution proved a highly ineffective strategy for development. In many coun-
tries industries were producing products with negative value added and innova-
3 Still, advocates of import substitution point out that during certain periods, countries that pursued
such policies did achieve strong economic growth, notably Brazil and Taiwan (China) in the 900s.
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tionwas stifled.4 Trade liberalizationmaycreate competition,but it does not do so
automatically. If trade liberalization occurs in an economy with a monopoly
importer, rents would simply be transferred from the government to the monopo-
list,with little decrease in prices.Trade liberalization is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for creating a competitive and innovative economy.
As or more important than creating competition in the previously sheltered
import-competing sector of the economy is promoting competition on the export
side. The success of the East Asian economies is a particularly powerful example.
By allowing each country to take advantage of its comparative advantage, trade
increases wages and expands consumption opportunities. For the last 5 years
trade has been doing just that–withworld trade growing at a 5 percent annual rate,
nearly twice the rate of world GDP growth.
Interestingly, we do not fully understand the process by which trade liberaliza-
tion leads to enhanced productivity. The standard Hecksher-Ohlin theory
predicts that countries will shift intersectorally, moving along their production
possibility frontier.Theywill produce more of what they are better at and trade for
what they areworse at. In reality themain gains from trade seem to come intertem-
porally, froman outward shift in the production possibility frontier from increased
efficiency,with little sectoral shift.Understanding the causes of this improvement
in efficiency requires an understanding of the links between trade, competition,
and liberalization. This is an area that needs to be pursued further.5
Privatization.Many countries have (or had) statemonopolies in certain indus-
tries that stifle competition. But the emphasis on privatization over the past
decade has comenot somuch from the concern about competition,as froma focus
on incentives. As mentioned previosuly, essential to a market economy are free,
competitivemarkets and private property.Manycountries–especially those in the
former socialist bloc – lacked both.
The Washington Consensus focused more on privatization than on competi-
tion. In a sense it was natural for them to do so.Not onlywere the state enterprises
inefficient, but their losses contributed to the government budget deficit, which
contributed to macroeconomic instability.Privatization would kill two birds with
one stone: it would simultaneously improve economic efficiency and reduce fiscal
4 But the usual argument was somewhat confused: it was lack of competition that stifled innovation,
not protectionism itself.Governments could have created competition among domestic firms,which
would have provided incentives to import new technology. It was the failure to create competition
internally more than the protection from abroad that was the cause of the stagnation. Competition
from abroad would have, of course, provided an important source of competition, but it is possible
that in the one-sided race, domestic firms would have dropped out of the competition rather than
enter the fray. Consumers might have benefited, but the effects on growth may have been more
ambiguous.
5 Elsewhere, I have explained how trade liberalization may both enhance incentives and opportuni-
ties for innovative activity (including the transfer of technology).The adverse effects associated with
protectionism may come more from its impact on competition and its inducement to rent seeking
behavior. These forces are so strong that even when there might be seemingly strong arguments for
trade interventions,based, for instance,on strategic trade theory,most economists view intervention
in trade policy with considerable skepticism.
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deficits. The idea was that, once property rights were created, the profit-maxi-
mizing behavior of owners would then eliminate waste and inefficiency. At the
same time the sale of the enterprises would raise much needed revenue for the
state.
In the transition economies rapid privatization represented a reasonable
gamble.Although most people would have preferred a more orderly restructuring
and establishment of an effective legal structure (covering contracts, bankruptcy
corporate governance and competition), no one knew how long the reform
window would stay open. At the time, privatizing quickly and comprehensively –
and fixing the problems later–seemed a reasonable gamble.In retrospect, it seems
clear that the advocates of privatization overestimated the benefits of privatiza-
tion and underestimated the costs, particularly the political costs of the process
itself and the impediments to further reform.Taking that same gamble today,with
the benefit of seven more years of experience, would be much less justified.
Even at the timemany of us warned against hastily privatizing without creating
the needed institutional infrastructure, including competitivemarkets and regula-
tory bodies. The conditions under which privatization can achieve the public
objectives of efficiency and equity are very limited and very similar to the condi-
tions under which competitive markets attain Pareto-efficient outcomes (see the
fundamental theorem of privatization in Sappington and Stiglitz 987). If, for
instance, competition is lacking, then creating a private, unregulated monopoly
will likely result in even higher prices for consumers. And there is some evidence
that, insulated from competition, private monopolies may suffer from several
forms of inefficiency and may not be highly innovative.
Indeed, large-scale public and private enterprises share many similarities and
facemany of the same organizational challenges.Bothmodels involve substantial
delegation of responsibility–neither legislatures nor shareholders in large compa-
nies directly control the daily activities of an enterprise. In both cases, the hier-
archy of authority terminates in managers who typically have a great deal of
autonomyand discretion.Rent seeking occurs in private enterprises, just as it does
in public enterprises. For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (989) and Edlin and
Stiglitz (995) have shown that there are strong incentives not only forprivate rent
seeking on the part of management, but also for taking actions that increase the
scope for rent seeking. In the Czech Republic the bold experiment with voucher
privatization seems to have foundered on precisely these issues.The issuemay not
be that public organizations cannot provide just as effective incentives, but that
typically they do not, and that they impose a variety of additional constraints.
Not only are the differences between public and private enterprises blurry, but
there is also a continuum of arrangements in between. Corporatization, for
instance, maintains government ownership but shifts toward hard budget
constraints and self-financing. (Another alternative is performance-based govern-
ment organizations, which use output-oriented performance measures.) Some
evidence suggests that many of the gains from privatization occur prior to privati-
zation – they arise from the process of corporatization, from putting in place effec-
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tive individual and organizational incentives (Caves and Christensen 980;
Pannier 996).
The importance of competition rather than ownership has been vividly demon-
strated by the very different experiences of China and Russia.China has managed
to sustain double-digit growth by extending the scope of competition, without
privatizing state-owned enterprises.To be sure, there are a number of problems in
the state-owned sector that should be addressed in the next stage of reforms. In
contrast,Russia has privatized a large fraction of its economywithout doingmuch
so far to promote competition.The consequence of this and other factors has been
a major economic collapse.
The magnitude and duration of this collapse is itself somewhat of a puzzle, at
least for standard economic theory. The Soviet economy was widely considered
rife with inefficiencies, and a substantial fraction of its output was devoted to mili-
tary expenditures. The elimination of these inefficiencies should have raised
GDP,6 while the reduction in military expenditures should have increased
personal consumption still further. Yet neither seems to have occurred.
The magnitude of the success of China’s economy over the past two decades
also represents a puzzle for standard theory. The economy not only eschewed a
strategy of outright privatization, but has also failed to incorporate numerous
other elements of the Washington Consensus. Yet China represents the greatest
success story of the last two decades. This can be seen in a number of different
ways. If China’s 30 provinces were separate economies (and many of them have
populations exceeding those of most other low-income countries), they would
have made up the 20 fastest-growing economies between 978 and 995 (World
Bank 997a).Alternatively, almost two-third’s of aggregate growth in low-income
countries between 978 and 995 is accounted for by the increase in China’s GDP
(by contrast, its GDP in 978 represented only about one-quarter of the aggregate
GDP of low-income countries and its population represented only 40 percent of
the total).7 One of the important lessons of the contrast betweenChina andRussia
is for the political economyof privatization and competition.Privatizingmonopo-
lies creates huge rents. It has proved difficult to administer privatization without
encouraging corruption and other problems. Entrepreneurs will have the incen-
tive to try to secure privatized enterprises rather than invest in creating their own
firms. In contrast, competition policy often undermines rents and creates incen-
tives forwealth creation.Furthermore, the sequencing of privatization and regula-
tion is very important. Privatizing a monopoly can create a powerful entrenched
16 We can think of this either as a movement toward the production possibilities frontier or as an
outward shift of the production possibilities curve (a technological “improvement”), where the
curve has embedded in it the institutional constraints reflecting howproduction and distribution are
organized.
17 These calculations are based onWorld Bank data.While measurement problems make it difficult to
make such comparisons with any precision, the broad picture we have drawn remains persuasive:
real incomes and consumption have fallen in the former Soviet empire, and real incomes and
consumption have risen remarkably rapidly in China.
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interest that undermines the possibility of regulation or competition in the future
(Stiglitz 989).
That being said, however, there are critical issues about the sequencing and
scope of privatization: even when privatization increases productive efficiency,
there may be problems in ensuring that broader public objectives, not well
reflected inmarket prices, are attained, and regulationmay be an imperfect substi-
tute.Should prisons, social services,or themaking of atomic bombs (or the central
ingredient of atomic bombs,highly enriched uranium) be privatized as some in the
United States have advocated? Where are the boundaries? One can introduce
more private sector activity into public activities, for example, through con-
tracting, and more incentive-based mechanisms like auctions. How effective are
these as substitutes for outright privatization? These are issues that all too often
the Washington Consensus has suppressed under the mantra of privatization.
Moreover, as we have seen, sequencing matters, not only because many of the
benefits of privatization are achieved only in the context of competitive markets,
but also because powerful interests groups can be created that suppress competi-
tion or that resist regulations to curb the abuses of monopoly power.
Regulation. Even accepting that competition is an essential ingredient of a
successful market economy, there are still some sectors of the economy in which
competition is not viable – the so-called natural monopolies.The extent and form
of competition, however, are constantly changing. New technologies have
expanded the scope for competition in many sectors that have historically been
highly regulated, such as telecommunications and electric power.
Traditional regulatory structures, however,with their rigid categories of regula-
tion or deregulation, and competition or monopoly, have been increasingly
unhelpful guides to policy in these areas. The new technologies do not call for
wholesale deregulation because not all parts of these industries are adequately
competitive. Instead, they call for appropriate changes in regulatory structure to
meet the new challenges. Such changes must recognize the existence of hybrid
areas of the economy, some part of which are more suited to competition, while
others are more vulnerable to domination by a few.Market power in one part of a
regulated industry cannot be allowed to maneuver itself into a stranglehold over
other parts, or else economic efficiency may be severely compromised.
Competition policy.Although the scope of viable competition has expanded,
competition is for a variety of reasons often far less than perfect, especially in
developing countries.We have come to understand the variety of ways in which
competition is suppressed– from implicit collusion to predatory pricing.We know
that control of the distribution system may effectively limit competition even
when there are many producers. We have become aware of the potential for
vertical restraints in restricting competition. And just as new technologies have
opened up new possibilities for competition, so too have they opened up new
opportunities for anticcompetitive behavior, as recent cases in theU.S.airline and
computer industries have evidenced.
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The development of effective antitrust laws for developing countries remains an
understudied area. Surely the sophisticated and complicated legal structures and
institutions that characterize antitrust in the United States are unlikely to be
appropriate for many developing countries.There may have to be greater reliance
on per se rules.
Competition policy also has important implications for thinking about trade pol-
icy. Currently, most countries have separate rules governing domestic competition
and international competition (Australia and New Zealand are exceptions).With
little if any justification, the rules governing competition in international trade (for
example, antidumping provisions and countervailing duties) are substantially stric-
ter than domestic antitrust laws (Stiglitz 997).Undermanycountries’laws on inter-
national trade,much of what is viewed domestically as healthy price competition is
classified as dumping. These abuses of fair trade were pioneered in the advanced
economies but are nowspreading to developing economies–which for the first time
in 996 surpassed industrial countries in the initiation of antidumping actions re-
ported to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization
(GATT/WTO;World Bank 997b).The best way to curtail these abuses is the full in-
tegrationof fair trade and fair competition laws,basedon thedeepunderstandingof
the nature of competition that antitrust authorities and industrial organization
economists have amassed over the course of a century.
Government as a Complement to Markets
So far I have been discussing the ways in which the Washington Consensus was
insufficent on the issues of macroeconomic stabilization, financial reform, liberal-
ized trade, and privatization. It contained important elements,but inmanyways it
did not go far enough in promoting issues like financial sector reformand competi-
tion policy.There are vital questions that theWashington Consensus did not even
address (or underemphasized). The first set of issues concerns what the govern-
ment should do; the second, how it can do what it does more effectively.
Formuch of this century people have looked to government to domore – spend
more and intervene more. Government spending as a share of GDP has grown
with these demands (figure 6). The Washington Consensus policies I have
discussedwere based on a rejection of the state’s activist role and the promotion of
a minimalist, noninterventionist state.The unspoken premise is that governments
are presumed to be worse than markets.Therefore the smaller the state, the better
(that is, less bad) the state.
As should be clear frommy remarks, I do not believe in blanket statements such
as “government is worse than markets.”8 I have argued that government has an
18 The enormous success of steel mills and shipping yards in many of the East Asian countries-the
highest productivity in the world-provides an important counterpoint to standard ideological posi-
tions.We do not fully understand why these countries were so successful in their state-owned enter-
prises while so many others were failures. But I have discussed how many have exaggerated the
differences between incentives in large private and public organizations.
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important role in responding tomarket failures,which are a general feature of any
economywith imperfect information and incomplete markets.The implication of
this view is that the task of making the state more effective is considerably more
complex than the task of just shrinking its size.
Typically, the state is involved in too many things and its activities lack focus
and concentration.As a result, the state is less effective than it might be.Trying to
get government to focus on the fundamentals – economic policies, basic educa-
tion, health, roads, law and order, environmental protection – is a vital step. But
focusing on the fundamentals is not a recipe forminimalist government.The state
has an important role to play in appropriate regulation, industrial policy, social
protection, and welfare. The choice should not be whether the state should or
should not be involved. Rather, it is often a matter of how it gets involved. More
important, we should not see the state and markets as substitutes.
Iwould argue that the government should see itself as a complement tomarkets,
undertaking those actions that makemarkets fulfill their functions better–aswell
as correcting market failures.We have already discussed one important instance
of a sector that simply does not function well without appropriate government
regulations – the financial sector (Stiglitz 993).Countries with successful econo-
mies also have governments that are involved in a range of other activities.In some
cases an argument can be made that the government has proven to be an effective
catalyst – its actions help solve the problem of an undersupply of (social) innova-
tion. But once it has performed its catalytic role, it needs to withdraw.Thus in the
United States the government established a national mortgage system,which has
lowered borrowing costs andmademortgages available tomillions ofAmericans –
leading to one of the highest home ownership rates in the world.But having done
this, the time may be at hand for the government to turn this activity over to the
private sector.
In this paper I cannot review all, or even the most important, areas in which
government can serve as a vital complement tomarkets. I shall discuss briefly only
two: one in which there is little disagreement about the paramount role of govern-
ment, and one that attracts less attention.
Human capital. The role of human capital in economic growth has long been
appreciated.Studies have found that the returns to an additional yearof education
in the United States, for instance, are between 5 and 5 percent.9 Growth
accounting also attributes a substantial portion of growth in developing countries
to human capital accumulation. The East Asian economies, for instance, empha-
sized the role of government in providing universal education,which was a neces-
sary part of their transformation from agrarian to rapidly industrializing econo-
mies.
Left to itself, the market will tend to underprovide human capital. It is very diffi-
cult to borrowagainst the prospects of future earnings since human capital itself is
19 For a general survey see Willis (986). More recent studies include Kane and Rouse (995) and
Ashenfelter and Krueger (994).
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not collaterizable.These difficulties are especially severe for less wealthy families.
The government plays an important role in providing public education, using
other methods to make education more affordable and enhancing access to
funding.
Transfer of technology. Studies of the returns to research and development
in industrial countries have consistently found individual returns in the range of
20 to 30 percent and social returns of 50 percent or even higher– far exceeding the
returns to education (Nadiri 993). Growth accounting usually attributes the
majority of per capita income growth to improvements in total factor produc-
tivity–Solow’s (957) pioneering analysis attributed 87.5 percent of the increase in
output per personhour between 909 and 949 to technical change.20 Based on a
standard Cobb-Douglas production function, the Republic of Korea’s per capita
income in 990 would have been only $2,04 (in 985 international dollars)
if it had relied solely on capital accumulation. In reality its per capita income
was $6,665, three times higher. The difference comes from increasing the
amount of output per unit of input,which is partly a result of improvements in tech-
nology.
The case that, by itself, the market underprovides technology is even more
compelling than the case for education. Investments in technology are subject to
similar financing problems as education because the investment cannot be used as
collateral. Investments in research and development are also considerably more
risky and open up much more serious adverse selection problems. More impor-
tant, technology has enormous externalities.Knowledge is like a public good–you
cannot exclude others from enjoying the benefits (nonexcludability) and one
person’s consumption does not diminish another’s ability to consume it (nonrival-
rous). As one of the great U.S. presidents, Thomas Jefferson, once said, ideas are
like a candle, you can use them to light other candles without diminishing the
original flame. As such, the benefits to society of increased investment in tech-
nology far outweigh the benefits to individual entrepreneurs.Without government
action there will be too little investment in the production and adoption of new
technology.
For most countries not at the technological frontier, facilitating the transfer of
technology hasmuch higher returns than original research and development.Poli-
cies to facilitate the transfer of technology are thus one of the keys to development.
One aspect of these policies is investing in human capital, especially in higher
education. The argument for funding universities is not just the provision of
human capital to particular individuals, but the major externalities that come
from enabling the economy to import ideas.Of course many developing countries
have high unemployment rates for university graduates and have many more
20 This is not always the case.According to the official growth accounting by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, total factor productivity has actually fallen since 978. These numbers are thoroughly
implausible, however, and there is considerable controversy about their interpretation. Part of the
problem with the recent numbers may lie in the biases in the measurement of inflation.
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university graduates employed in unproductive civil service jobs.These countries
have probably overemphasized liberal arts education. In contrast, Korea has
narrowed the productivity gap with the world’s lead economies through the
training of scientists and engineers (figure 7).
Another policy that can promote the transfer of technology is foreign direct
investment. Singapore, for example,was able to assimilate rapidly the knowledge
that came from its large inflows of foreign direct investment.
Finally, I would like to note briefly that the policies adopted by technological
leaders also matter. There can be a tension between the incentives to produce
knowledge and the benefits from more effective dissemination. In recent years
there has been much concern – including on the part of small firms in industrial
countries, the academic community throughout the world, and many people in
developing countries – that the balance industrial countries have struck, often
under pressure from special interest groups, underemphasizes dissemination.The
consequences, they argue, may slow both the overall pace of innovation and
adversely affect living standards in both richer and poorer countries.2
Making Government More Effective
Let me return for a moment to our objective of this part of the talk: how do we
design policies that increase the productivity of the economy? I have stressed that
we should not confuse ends with means; that the elements emphasized by the
Washington Consensus may have been reasonable means for addressing the
particular set of problems confronting, say, the Latin American economies in the
980s, but may not be the only, or even the central, elements of policies aimed at
addressing problems in other circumstances.
Part of the strategy for a more productive economy that I have just stressed is
ascertaining the appropriate role for government: identifying for instance, the
ways in which government can be a more effective complement to markets. I now
want to turn to another essential element of public policy: how we can make
government more effective in accomplishing the tasks it undertakes.WorldDevel-
opmentReport 997: The State in aChangingWorld shows that an effective state is
vital for development (World Bank 997c). Using data from 94 countries over
three decades, the report shows that it is not just economic policies and human
capital, but the quality of a country’s institutions that determine economic
outcomes. Institutions, in effect, set the overall environment underwhichmarkets
operate.Aweak institutional environment allows greater arbitrariness on the part
of state agencies and public officials.
21 Knowledge is an input – a key input – into the production of knowledge: an increase in the “price”of
knowledge (as a result of stricter intellectual property standards)may thereby reduce the production
of knowledge. There is also a concern that too many resources go to research directed at trying to
convert “common knowledge” into a form that is appropriable. While in principle “novelty” stan-
dards are intended to guard against this activity, in practice the line is never perfectly clear, and
stricter intellectual property regimes are more likely to commit errors of privatizing public knowl-
edge – and of thereby creating incentives for misdirecting intellectual energies in that direction.
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Given very different starting points, unique histories, cultures, and societal
factors, how can states be mademore effective? Part of the answer is that the state
should match its role to its capability.What the government does, and how it does
it, should obviously reflect the capabilities of the government – and those of the
private sector. Low-income countries often have weaker markets and weaker
government institutions. It is especially important, therefore, that they focus on
how they can most effectively complement markets.
But capability is not destiny. States can improve their capabilities by reinvigor-
ating their institutions.This does not meanmerely building administrative or tech-
nical capacity.More important, it means instituting rules and norms that provide
state officialswith incentives to act in the collective interest while restraining arbi-
trary action and corruption. Five interrelated mechanisms can help to enhance
state capability:
c Rules and restraints are crucial for a professional and capable bureaucracy.An
independent judiciary, institutional checks and balances through the separa-
tion of powers, and effective watchdogs can all restrain arbitrary state action
and corruption.
c The civil service needs to bemore effective,offering competitivewages to attract
talented people.
c State capability can also be enhanced through voice and partnerships by
bringing the government close to the people and by seeking stakeholder feed-
back in policymaking and service delivery.
c There are ways in which governments can improve their efficiency and efficacy
by using market-like mechanisms in the public sector, for instance, designing
and using performance standards, establishing incentive systems based on
performance standards, employing auctions for procurement and selling such
public assets as spectrum licenses, and using performance standards for regula-
tion in areas like environment and safety.
c The state needs to adopt policies that reduce the scope for rent seeking.Market
mechanisms, like auctioning off natural resources or spectrum allocations, are
one way to reduce the private sector’s incentive to push for the artificial crea-
tion of scarcity.In addition,curtailing discretionary activities–such as licensing
and trade restrictions – also reduces rent seeking.
Broadened Goals of Development
The Washington Consensus advocated a set of instruments (including macro-
economic stability, liberalized trade, and privatization) to achieve a relatively
focused goal (economic growth). The post-Washington Consensus begins by
recognizing that a broader set of instruments is necessary to achieve those goals.
I have discussed some of most important instruments, including financial regula-
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tion, competition policy, investments in human capital, and policies to facilitate
the transfer of technology.
My second theme here is that the post-Washington Consensus also recognizes
that our goals are much broader.We seek increases in living standards, including
improved health and education – not just increases in measured GDP. We seek
sustainable development, which includes preserving our natural resources and
maintaining a healthy environment. We seek equitable development, which
ensures that all groups in society enjoy the fruits of development,not just the fewat
the top. And we seek democratic development, in which citizens participate in a
variety of ways in making the decisions that affect their lives.
Knowledge has not kept pace with the proliferation of our goals.We are only
beginning to understand the relationship between democratization, inequality,
environmental protection,and growth.Whatwe do knowholds out the promise of
developing complementary strategies that can move us toward all of these objec-
tives. But we must recognize that given our highly multidimensional objectives,
not all policies will contribute to all objectives. There will be tradeoffs and hard
choices.We need to improve our understanding of these inevitable tradeoffs if we
are going to make more informed choices in the future.
I would like to illustrate this by discussing four policy areas, two in which poli-
cies can achieve complementary goals and two in which tradeoffs are inevitably
involved.
Complement : Education
Promoting human capital is one example of a complementary policy, one that can
help promote economic development, equality, participation, and democracy.
Again the East Asian experience contains important lessons. I have already
discussed the role of education in promoting human capital and growth. In East
Asia, universal education also created a more egalitarian society, facilitating the
political stability that is a precondition for successful long-term economic devel-
opment. Furthermore, education – especially education that emphasizes critical,
scientific thinking – can help train citizens to participate more effectively and
more intelligently in public decisions.
Complement II: Environment
A second set of ways in which a single instrument can help achieve multiple goals
comes from environmental policy.Consider, as an example, the joint implementa-
tion of a policy for reducing carbon emissions.
To minimize global climate change, the world needs to devise strategies to
reduce the production of greenhouse gasses, especially carbon dioxide, which is
produced primarily by combustion. The reduction of carbon emissions is truly a
global problem: all carbon emissions enter the atmosphere, producing global
consequences that are independent of their geographical origin.
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Joint implementation gives industrial countries (or companies within them)
credit for emissions reductions that they might not otherwise have undertaken
anywhere in the world. It may be a feasible first step toward designing an efficient
system of emission reductions because it requires commitments only from indus-
trial countries and therefore does not entail resolving the huge distributional
issues involved in systems of tradable permits or in the undertaking of obligations
by developing countries.
The premise of joint implementation is that the marginal cost of carbon reduc-
tions may differ markedly in different countries. In particular, developing coun-
tries are typically less energy efficient than industrial countries. As a result the
marginal cost of carbon reduction in developing countries may be substantially
lower than in industrial countries. TheWorld Bank has offered to set up a carbon
investment fund that would allow countries and companies that needed to pursue
emissions reductions to invest in carbon-reducing projects in developing coun-
tries. For developing countries this plan would offer increased investment flows
and pro-environment technology transfers. These projects would also be likely to
reduce the collateral environmental damage caused by dirty air.And for industrial
countries joint implementation allows carbon emissions to be reduced at a lower
cost. This is a strategy that is designed to benefit developing countries as it
improves the global environment.
Tradeoff I: Investments in Technology
Not all policies are about complementary goals, such as investing in primary
education or jointly implementing emissions reductions. Many policies entail
tradeoffs. It is important to face these tradeoffs and to make choices about priori-
ties.Concentrating solelyon“win-win”can lead policymakers to ignore important
decisions about“win-lose”policies.One important example of a potential tradeoff
is investments in technology.Earlier Imentioned how investments in tertiary tech-
nical education promote the transfer of technology and thus economic growth.
The direct beneficiaries of these investments,however,are almost inevitably better
off than average. The result is likely to be rising inequality.
More generally, the transfer of technology may even increase inequality.
Although some innovations benefit the worst-off, much technological progress
raises the marginal products of those who are already more productive. Even
when it does not, the opportunity cost of public investment in technologymight be
foregone investment in antipoverty programs. By increasing output, however,
these investments can benefit the entire society. The potential trickle down,
however, is not necessarily rapid or comprehensive.
Tradeoff II: Environment and Participation
My second example of a tradeoff is between environmental goals and participa-
tion.We now recognize that participation is essential. But while participation is
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essential,we should not be confused: participation is not a substitute for expertise.
Studies have shown, for instance, that popular views on the ranking of various
environmental health risks are uncorrelated with the scientific evidence (EPA
987; Slovic,Layman,and Flynn 993). In pursuing environmental policies,dowe
seek to make people feel better about their environment, or do we seek to reduce
real environmental health hazards? There is a delicate balance here, but at the
very least,more dissemination of knowledge can result inmore effective participa-
tion in formulating more effective policies.
Concluding Remarks
I would now like to make some concluding remarks. The goal of the Washington
Consensuswas to provide a formula for creating a vibrant private sector and stimu-
lating economic growth. In retrospect the policy recommendations were highly
risk averse. They were based on the desire to avoid the worst disasters. Although
the Washington Consensus provided part of the foundation for well-functioning
markets, it was incomplete and sometimes even misleading. The World Bank’s
(993) East Asian miracle study was a significant turning point in the discussion .
It showed that the stunning success of the East Asian economies depended on
much more than just macroeconomic stability or privatization. I have explicitly
discussed the lessons of the East Asian miracle elsewhere (Stiglitz 996), but
the general ideas pervade all of my remarks here. Without a robust financial
system –which the government plays a huge role in creating and maintaining – it
is difficult to mobilize savings or to allocate capital efficiently. Unless the
economy is competitive, the benefits of free trade and privatization will be dissi-
pated in rent seeking, not directed toward wealth creation. And if public invest-
ments in human capital and technology transfers is insufficient, the market will
not fill in the gap.
Many of these ideas and others notmentioned here are the basis ofwhat I see as
an emerging consensus, a post-Washington Consensus consensus. One principle
of these emerging ideas is that whatever the new consensus is, it cannot be based
on Washington. For policies to be sustainable, they must be owned by the devel-
oping countries that will implement them. It is relatively easy to monitor and set
conditions for inflation rates and current account balances. Doing the same for
financial sector regulation or competition policy is neither feasible nor desirable.
The second principle of the emerging consensus is a greater degree of humility, the
frank acknowledgement that we do not have all the answers. Continued research
and discussion not just between theWorld Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, but throughout the world is essential if we are to better understand how to
achieve our many goals.
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Figure . Public Sector Deficits: Latin America versus East Asia
Note: Calculations based on data from IMF International Financial Statistics Database.
Figures for Thailand are from 995.
Figure 2. Inflation: Latin America versus East Asia
Note: Unweighted regional averages based on World Development Indicators 997
data.
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Figure 3. Inflation Rates in Developing Countries 985, 995
Source: World Development Indicators 997.
Note: 2 of 58 low- and middle-income countries.
Figure 4. Volatility of GDP Growth, 970-995
Source: Calculations based on real annual growth from World Development Indicators
997.
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Sri Lanka (989-993) 5.0%
Malaysia (985-988) 4.7%
Norway (987-989) 4.0%
United States (984-99) 3.2%
Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (996).
Figure 5. GDP Growth before and after Banking Crises, 975-994
Source: Caprio (997).
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Figure 6. Government Spending in Selected Countries
(as a percentage of GDP)
Note: Data from IMF Government Financial Statistics.
Figure 7. Tertiary Level Students in Technical Fields
(percentage of population)
Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 995, Government of Taiwan, Taiwan Statistical
Yearbook 994, Ministry of Education (Singapore).
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